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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite its relatively small share of the economy as a whole,' mining
has played a disproportionately large role in the growth of U.S. safety and health
regulation. In part, the industry's unique salience is explained by its unique
hazards: for much of the 20th century, mining was one of the most dangerous
occupations.2 Moreover, few workplace accidents over the past century have
commanded the public's attention or galvanized subsequent reform efforts as
effectively as mining catastrophes. The Monongah Mining Disaster of 1907,
which claimed hundreds of miners' lives,3 helped trigger the creation of the U.S.
Bureau of Mines in 1910, the federal government's first comprehensive foray
into the safety-and-health arena.4 The Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
("Coal Act") heralded a new era of federal regulation, in which inspectors were
empowered not only to inspect coal mines but also to issue monetary and crimi-
nal penalties for statutory violations.5 Not until the following year did Congress
I In 2005, the U.S. mining industry, excluding oil and gas extraction, represented approxi-
mately 0.25% of the national GDP. MOORE ECON., NAT'L MINING ASS'N, THE ECON.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE MINING INDUS. IN 2005 36 tbl. 25 (2007), available at
http://www.nma.org/pdf/pubs/mining-economic-report.pdf. This proportion has declined in
recent decades. In 1981, for example, the comparable figure was 0.73%. BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSIS, GROSS-DOMESTIC-PRODUCT-(GDP)-BY-INDUSTRY DATA,
http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind-data.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2008) (click the XLS link
under NAICS Data; then click the 1947-87_97NAICS-VA tab within the spreadsheet).
2 See Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), Historical Data 1931-1977: Coal,
Metal, Nonmetal, Stone, and Sand and Gravel Mines and Mills,
http://www.msha.gov/STATS/PART50/WQ/1931/wq3lam01.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2008)
(scroll down to "Frequency rate per million man-hour") (showing the injury and fatality rates for
mining for every year between 1931 and 1977).
3 Compare MSHA, FACT SHEET 95-8: HISTORICAL DATA ON MINE DISASTERS IN THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/FactSheets/MSHAFCT8.HTM (last visited July 16,
2008) ("the Monongah coal mine explosion ... claimed 362 lives"), with DAVrr McATEER,
MONONGAH: THE TRAGIC STORY OF THE WORST INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT IN U.S. HISTORY 241
(2007) ("[I]t is reasonable to conclude that the disaster at the Monongah mines certainly claimed
in excess of 500 lives and probably more than 550 men.").
4 See, e.g., MSHA, supra note 3 ("the Monongah coal mine explosion ... impelled Congress
to created [sic] the Bureau of Mines."); Mark Aldrich, Preventing "the Needless Peril of the Coal
Mine": The Bureau of Mines and the Campaign against Coal Mine Explosions, 1910-1940, 36
TECH. & CULTURE 483, 489 (1995) (noting that A, B. Fleming, who had operated the Monongah
mine, testified in March of 1908 to the House Committee on Mines and Mining, in support of a
"bureau of mines," the establishment of which the committee was considering). For a brief his-
tory of federal involvement in mine safety, see MSHA, HISTORY OF MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
LEGISLATION, http://www.msha.gov/mshainfo/mshainf2.htm (last visited July 16, 2008) (noting
that the 1910 law was the first to establish a federal agency to conduct research and reduce acci-
dents in coal mines operating in the continental U.S.).
5 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969)
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000)).
[Vol. 111
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 111, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss1/7
MINING MINING DATA
extend similar protections to the rest of the U.S. economy through the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act.6
Legislative reform in the wake of well-publicized disasters continues to
the present day. On January 2, 2006, an explosion in the Wolf Run Mining
Company's Sago Mine near Sago, West Virginia, killed twelve miners and seri-
ously injured another.7 An internal review conducted by the Mining Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA) identified several "deficiencies in MSHA's
actions at the Sago Mine" whose "root causes," the report concluded, "must be
corrected." 8 The Sago explosion helped spur the passage of the Mine Improve-
ment and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 ("MINER Act"),9 which
amended and strengthened federal enforcement powers.10 Some observers felt,
however, that the MINER Act did not go far enough to strengthen mandatory
safety standards - particularly those applicable during emergencies - and to
punish repeat violators. 1 In January, 2008, the Supplemental Mine Improve-
ment and New Emergency Response Act of 2007 ("S-MINER Act"), 12 designed
to further these goals, passed the House. As of this writing, the bill awaits con-
sideration by the Senate.
At first glance, MSHA has much in common with its "sister" agency,
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which oversees the
rest of the U.S. economy. Both agencies promulgate standards, inspect private
workplaces, issue citations, and levy penalties for non-compliance. Yet the dif-
ferences between the two agencies are equally striking. The Coal Act (and the
Mine Act, which broadened its coverage and strengthened its provisions eight
years later) requires federal officials to inspect each underground mine at least
four times a year and every surface mine at least twice a year.' 3 In contrast,
6 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000).
7 See MSHA, INTERNAL REVIEW OF MSHA's ACTIONS AT THE SAGO MINE[,] WOLF RUN
MINING COMPANY[,] SAGO, UPSHUR COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA 3-4 (June 28, 2007), available at
http://www.msha.gov/Readroom/FOIA/20071ntemalReviews/Sago%2OInternal%2OReview%20R
eport.pdf (last visited July 17, 2008) (summarizing history of Sago explosion).
8 Id. at 1-2.
9 Mine Improvement and New Energy Response Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-236, 120 Stat.
493 (2006) (codified as amended at 30 USC 801 (2000)).
10 The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, in considering the bill
that would become the MINER Act, cited the Sago tragedy as an important part of the bill's gene-
sis. See S. Rep. No. 109-365, at 2 (2006) ("After the Sago Mine accident on January 2, 2006, the
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee assembled a group of members to
travel to West Virginia to explore the need for reforms to the Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977."). For a summary of the Act's key provisions, see MSHA, MINE IMPROVEMENT AND NEW
EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACT OF 2006,
http://www.msha.gov/mineract/MineActAmmendmentSummary.asp (last visited July 17, 2008).
"1 See, e.g., Dennis B. Roddy, Bush Signs Safety Law: Critics Say Legislation Doesn't Go Far
Enough in Protecting Miners, PrrrsBURGH POST-GAZETrE, June 16, 2006, at Al.
12 H.R. 2768, 110th Cong. (2007).
13 Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 9 Stat. 1290, § 103(a)
(codified at 30 U.S.C. § 813 (2000)). Eight years later, the Mine Act broadened the scope of
2008]
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OSHA's budget enables it to inspect only a small fraction of U.S. establish-
ments in any given year.' 4 Secondly, while safety-and-health laws generally
may be enforced by either federal or state officials (depending on whether a
given state has chosen to exercise its right to "opt out" of the federal OSHA
system and assume enforcement authority), mining regulations are always en-
forced by federal inspectors. 5 Finally, while the outcomes of safety-and-health
inspections are publicly available for the entire regulated economy, only the
Mining Act requires employers to report, and make publicly available, each and
every mining accident, injury, and fatality in "real time."
By most accounts, the passage of this comprehensive regulatory scheme
was a marked success. The sharp decline in mining fatality rates that character-
ized most of the 1970s16 has generally been attributed to the deterrent impact of
federal regulation.17 In more recent decades, these initially dramatic trends have
become more attenuated. Although the rate of nonfatal injuries has generally
declined since the 1990s, fatality rates have remained fairly constant, prompting
one MSHA official to suggest by the mid 1990s that "a plateau ha[d] been
reached."' 8 Yet despite recent attempts to scale back federal enforcement, 19 and
periodic fluctuations over time in the level of fines imposed,20 the core regula-
tory requirements set forth in the Mine Act have remained essentially un-
changed for over three decades.
regulatory authority to non-coal mines, and also charged the newly created Mining Safety and
Health Administration with enforcement authority.
14 Thomas J. Kniesner & John D. Leeth, Data Mining Mining Data: MSHA Enforcement Ef-
forts, Underground Coal Mine Safety, and New health Policy Implications, 29 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 83, 84 (2004) ("[O]n a per establishment basis MSHA's enforcement budget is
over 400 times larger [than OSHA's], and on a per worker basis over 150 times larger than
OSHA's.").
15 For the OSHA "opt-out" provision, see 29 U.S.C. § 667 (2000).
16 See MSHA, supra note 2.
17 Since the decline in serious injuries is an economy-wide phenomenon, though, it is unclear
whether the decreasing mining fatality rates should be attributable to MSHA enforcement. For
economy-wide data on workplace injuries and fatalities, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, INJURYILLNESS
INCIDENCE RATES, http://www.osha.gov/oshstats/work.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
18 Davitt McAteer, Mine Safety and Health: A Formula for Continued Success, 96 W. VA. L.
REv. 847, 848 (1994). For injury and fatality data through 2006, see MSHA, MINING INDUSTRY
ACCIDENT, INJURIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTION DATA,
http://www.msha.gov/ACCINJ/accinj.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2008) (under "Historical Statistics
- 1931 Through 2006," click on the respective hyperlink for coal and metal mining; then click on
the "Number of Fatal Injuries and Fatal Incident Rates (IR)" hyperlink).
19 In 1995, Congress considered a measure that would have eliminated the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), eased penalties on operators, and provided general
exemptions and defenses against enforcements. See H.R. 1834, 104th Cong. (1995).
20 For a discussion of changes in MSHA's fee structure, see Kniesner & Leeth, supra note 14,
at 89; see also id. ("Considering inflation, the changes in penalties mean [that] MSHA fines in real
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Notwithstanding the historical prominence of mining regulation, the
unique breadth of regulatory oversight, and the plethora of historical data avail-
able, formal empirical analysis of MSHA's regulatory behavior and efficacy has
been remarkably scarce. Only a handful of studies have analyzed historical time
trends in an effort to measure the effects of federal oversight, and even fewer
have examined detailed measures of MSHA's inspection activity. To date,
therefore, most scholarship regarding the historical (and potential) scope of reg-
ulatory intervention in the mining industry has relied on anecdotal evidence and
casual empiricism.
In this Article, I argue that to galvanize its regulatory activity and
achieve further improvements in mine safety, MSHA should bring empirical
analysis to bear on the wealth of mine-level data that it has been collecting for
decades. Careful analysis of historical data could reveal much about the distri-
bution of mining disasters, the relationship between compliance and safety, and
the magnitude of MSHA's specific deterrence effect - all of which could give
the agency fresh insights into the impact and limitations of its current regulatory
practices. But the agency could go even further. Recent methodological and
technological advances provide a unique opportunity for MSHA to experiment
with statistically based regulatory targeting techniques. By developing a target-
ing algorithm to identify high-risk mines - which can be continuously refined
and updated as new mine-level information is collected - the agency could ac-
quire a powerful new tool for preventing future mining disasters.
The remainder of this Article sketches in greater detail how MSHA
could use empirical techniques to enhance its regulatory practices. In Part H, I
set the stage for the discussion that follows by critically reviewing prior empiri-
cal scholarship on mining regulation. Part HI explains what makes mining data
so unique as compared to data on other regulated industries, and describes how
analyzing this data could shed new light on MSHA's current regulatory prac-
tices. Part IV briefly summarizes the theory of targeted regulation, and de-
scribes several prior real-world applications to the U.S. regulatory arena. Part V
outlines how MSHA could develop a targeting protocol to identify high-risk
mines, identifying the methodological and practical challenges that regulators
would confront, and suggesting how they might be overcome. Part VI summa-
rizes the key conclusions.
I. PAST EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON MINING SAFETY REGULATION
Most prior empirical scholarship on coal mining regulation has focused
on four questions: (1) whether passage of the Coal Act and/or Mine Act im-
proved mine safety;2' (2) the relationship, if any, between coal-mine safety and
productivity; 22 (3) the effect, if any, of unionization on coal mine safety; 23 and
21 See infra notes 25, 26, 34, 35.
22 See infra notes 31-33.
23 See infra notes 34-35.
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(4) MSHA's estimated marginal general deterrent effect on mine safety in recent
decades.24 For the most part, however, such research has yielded few policy-
relevant findings that might enable MSHA to gauge the current or potential ef-
fectiveness of alternative regulatory practices. 25
The first question - whether the advent of federal regulation achieved
its intended goal of improving mine safety - was a primary theme of empirical
scholarship in the early years following the Coal Act's passage. Juxtaposing
national trends in injury rates before and after the passage of federal legislation,
a handful of empirical studies dating from the 1970s and early 1980s explored
whether the passage of the Coal Act (or Mining Act) triggered the subsequent
decline in the rate of mining fatalities. The first study of this kind relied on a
data series ending in 1970.26 Since meaningful regulatory activity did not begin
until midyear - and the study thus incorporated only a few months of post-Act
data - it was hardly surprising that the findings were inconclusive. Four later
studies, armed with additional years of post-Act data, probed the same question.
Using a multiple interrupted time-series model to isolate the effect of the Coal
Act on fatality rates, two of these studies concluded that the Act had signifi-
cantly improved miners' safety during the years immediately following its pas-
sage.28 Given the significant methodological and empirical assumptions upon
which both studies relied, their inference of a causal relationship should be seen
as tentative at best.29 Although the third study's authors, Neumann and Nelson,
24 See infra notes 39-40.
25 Although empirical scholars have probed a few other aspects of coal mine safety, they are
not discussed here because none pertains directly to the analysis of regulation. See, e.g., James D.
Bennett & David L. Passmore, Days Lost from Work Due to Injuries in U.S. Underground Bitu-
minous Coal Mines, 1975-1981, 5 J. OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENTs 265 (1984) (examining whether
the severity of injuries is predictable based on mine and miner characteristics); Jack Reardon,
Injuries and Illnesses Among Bituminous and Lignite Coal Miners, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct.
1993, at 49 (comparing the relative frequency of different mining injuries as well as the relative
injuriousness of different mining methods); Michael Wallace, Dying for Coal: The Struggle for
Health and Safety Conditions in American Coal Mining, 1930-82, 66 Soc. FORCES 336 (1987)
(examining the importance of industrial business climate and resource mobilization theory in
explaining injury rates).
26 Tom S. Witt et al., Comment, Some Economic Factors Affecting Safety in Underground
Bituminous Coal Mines: 42 S. ECON. J. 306 (1975). For a comment on the study, see W. H. An-
drews & C. L. Christenson, Reply, Some Economic Factors Affecting Safety in Underground
Bituminous Coal Mines, 42 S. ECON. J. 308 (1975).
27 Witt, supra note 26, at 308.
28 See Michael S. Lewis-Beck & John R. Alford, Can Government Regulate Safety? The Coal
Mine Example, 74 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 745 (1980); Charles S. Perry, Government Regulation of
Coal Mine Safety: Effects of Spending Under Strong and Weak Law, 10 AM. POL. RE. 303
(1982).
29 Lewis-Beck and Alford model fatality rates as a simple function of the passage of time
(specifically, the number of years elapsed since 1932); the presence of several mining-related
laws; the number of elapsed years since each respective law's passage; and three macroeconomic
control variables (tons of output per man hour, the percentage of small mines, and the percentage
of miners working underground). See Lewis-Beck & Alford, supra note 28, at 748. Although
[Vol. I111
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used a different modeling approach with equally significant methodological
limitations, the authors drew the same (albeit more qualified) conclusion that the
Act tended to reduce the frequency of fatal accidents.30  The fourth and final
study reached conclusions very similar to Neumann and Nelson after correcting
some of the earlier study's methodological drawbacks.3'
On the whole, then, empirical scholarship on the Act's initial passage
has drawn the same tentative inference that casual observation of the time trends
would suggest: passage of the Act was remarkably coincident with, and may
indeed have caused, the drop in fatalities that characterized most of the 1970s.
Even if the shortcomings of earlier scholarship were corrected, because the
Act's passage was a one-time historical event that affected all mines equally - at
a time when complex political and economic changes were also convulsing the
appealingly simple, a number of the methodological assumptions upon which this model relies -
that the mere passage of time has a linear effect on injury rates, as does the number of elapsed
years since a law's passage; that the effect of any given law persists indefinitely in linear fashion
even after it has been superseded by subsequent legislation; that the cumulative effect of legisla-
tion in any given year is simply the combined effect of all prior laws passed in prior years - seem
problematic. Moreover, the assumption that output per man hour was a meaningful measure of
technological change from 1970-76 seems dubious, since widespread labor unrest, manifested in
frequent work stoppages and wildcat strikes, have been identified as a major cause of falling pro-
ductivity. See, e.g., JOE G. BAKER & WAYNE L. STEVENSON, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
DETERMINANTS OF COAL MINE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE iii (1979). Although Perry includes
total federal spending in his model - along with dummy variables corresponding to the period in
which each law was in effect, and the interaction of spending and time period - he controls for no
macroeconomic variables at all. Rather, he simply includes the number of elapsed years since
1930 as a composite "indicator of nongovernmental enforcement mechanisms" in a model in-
tended to differentiate between "effective" and "ineffective" laws. See Perry, supra note 28, at
308.
30 See George R. Neumann & Jon P. Nelson, Safety Regulation and Firm Size: Effects of the
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 25 J.L. & ECON. 183, 198 (1982). As the authors con-
cede, interpretation of their results largely depends on whether the Act caused small mines to exit
the industry. Id. at 192. In short, if the dramatic decline in small firms' share of the industry is
attributable to the Act's passage, their results appear much more supportive of the hypothesis that
the Act lowered fatal injuries, although no similar evidence was found linking the Act's passage to
a decline in total injuries. As with the two earlier studies, however, the model relies on a number
of questionable modeling assumptions. Most importantly, the authors (with no justification) use
the number of accidents per ton as the dependent variable in all regressions, and omit to include
any controls for the number of labor-hours worked. Given the sharp decline in productivity fol-
lowing the Act's passage - at least part of which was attributable to exogenous widespread labor
unrest and a spike in demand for coal during this period - the results are likely to be biased
against the conclusion that the Act had a significant impact. See, e.g,, BAKER & STEVENSON,
supra note 29, at iii-iv (citing both factors); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LOW PRODUCTIVITY
IN AMERICAN COAL MINING: CAUSES AND CURES iii (1981) (emphasizing importance of labor
unrest).
31 See Scott M. Fuess, Jr. & Mark A. Lowenstein, Further Analysis of the Theory of Economic
Regulation: The Case of the 1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 28 ECON. INQUIRY 354, 370-
71 (1990) (using number of fatalities per million man hours worked as the dependent variable, and
relying on a richer set of control variables, concluding that the 1969 Act lowered fatalities, but
only significantly so if it was responsible for the falling market share of smaller, less safe mines).
20081
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industry32 - it would probably be difficult to draw any definitive conclusions
regarding the Act's causal impact. On one hand, the downward trend in fatality
rates that characterized MSHA's early years is at least consistent with the view
that inaugurating a comprehensive regulatory regime can help deter at least the
most severe types of occupational accidents. On the other hand, this body of
scholarship provides little insight into why fatality rates leveled off by the
1990s, and whether any changes in regulatory practices might trigger further
declines.
A second goal of empirical scholarship has been to examine the trade-
off, if any, between mine safety and productivity. As long as firm behavior can
affect accident frequency and the federally mandated level of safety expendi-
tures exceeds that which firms would choose under free market conditions, eco-
nomic theory predicts that such a tradeoff should exist. 33 Framing the issue in
historical terms, one strand of scholarship has asked whether the passage of the
Coal Act caused the decline in industry productivity during the decade after its
passage. Relying on a wide variety of data sources and methodologies, those
studies addressing this issue have uniformly concluded that the new require-
ments imposed by the Act were indeed partly responsible for the decline in min-
ing productivity that endured through most of the 1970s.34 In and of itself, how-
ever, the existence of such a macroeconomic tradeoff does not imply that a simi-
larly negative relationship between productivity and safety exists across firms.
To explore the latter question, several articles have probed whether there is a
correlation between safety and productivity among individual mines. Relying
on cross-sectional firm-level data, such scholarship has tended to find that the
most productive mines, if anything, have lower-than-average serious injury
and/or fatality rates.35 The most common interpretation is not that higher pro-
32 See BAKER & STEVENSON, supra note 29; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30
(citing severe labor unrest, spike in demand, and various other factors as shaping mining industry
trends in 1970s).
33 See, e.g., Hal Sider, Safety and Productivity in Underground Coal Mining, 65 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 225, 225-27 (1983).
34 See BAKER & STEVENSON, supra note 29, at iii (finding that Coal Act was partly responsible
for decline in deep mine labor productivity); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at ii
(although reaching same conclusion, suggesting that its impact diminished after 1977); Neuman &
Nelson, supra note 30, at 195 (concluding that the Act depressed productivity based on analysis of
national trends); Sider, supra note 33, at 232 (based on a study of 26 mines in Illinois, and assum-
ing that job safety and productivity are jointly determined by a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion, concluding that the Act was partly responsible for a subsequent decline in the production of
marketable output). See also Fuess & Loewenstein, supra note 31 (although not directly analyz-
ing productivity effects, finding that the Act's engineering standards caused smaller producers to
exit industry and depressed output both nationwide and among underground coal mines in Ken-
tucky).
35 See JOHN M. DEMICHIEt ET AL., MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN, FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH
DISABLING INJURIES IN UNDERGROUND COAL MINES 27 (1982) (finding that mines with low injury
rates were more productive than other mines included in the study); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, supra note 30, at 44 (finding negative association in cross-sectional firm-level comparison
[Vol. I111
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ductivity causes lower injuries (or vice versa), but - as one scholar has suc-
cinctly put it - that "safety and productivity share the same sire - competent
management. 36 From a policy perspective, the more interesting question is
how the passage of any given safety standard affects the marginal productivity
of different mines over time. So far, however, the longitudinal data required to
explore such detailed questions have been unavailable. Therefore, notwith-
standing the scholarly consensus that the Coal Act lowered mining productivity
shortly after its passage, empirical scholarship on the "safety-productivity trade-
off' has shed little light on the impact of regulatory behavior in more recent
decades.
A third empirical question upon which several empirical scholars have
focused is the relationship between mine safety and unionization. A recent his-
torical study found that union status lowered the predicted fatality rate by about
40 percent among early twentieth-century coal mines.37 However, studies fo-
cusing on the decade after the Coal Act's passage have yielded more mixed
findings. Studies by Boden, Connerton, and Appleton & Baker - all of which
analyzed data from the 1970s - found that injury rates were higher in union
mines, controlling for other mine-specific factors.38 Based on data from 1978 to
1980, however, a National Academy of Sciences study found no significant dif-
ferences in fatality rates among union and nonunion mines after controlling for
differences in mine size. 39 For several reasons, it is difficult to draw causal in-
ferences on the basis of these studies alone. First, since the accident reporting
system in use before 1978 was subject to extremely poor reporting practices,
underreporting of injuries by nonunion mines could have biased the results of
of productivity and fatalities and permanent disabilities, albeit positive association between pro-
ductivity and temporarily disabling injuries); NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, TOWARD SAFER
UNDERGROUND COAL MINES 98 (1982) (finding negative association in cross-sectional firm-level
comparison of productivity and rates of disabling injuries); William C. Appleton & Joe G. Baker,
The Effect of Unionization on Safety in Bituminous Deep Mines, 5 J. LAB. RES. 139, 143 (1984)
(finding significant negative relationship between mine productivity and rates of total and dis-
abling injuries, respectively); Andrew Hopkins, Blood Money? The Effect of Bonus Pay on Safety
in Coal Mines, 20 AuSTL. & N.Z. J. Soc. 23 (1984) (reporting similar negative association be-
tween mine productivity and accident rates among firms in New South Wales, Australia).
36 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY 170
(1985).
37 See William M. Boal, The Effect of Unionism on Accidents in U.S. Coal Mining, 1897-1929
(working paper, forthcoming in INDUS. REL.), available at
http://www.drake.edu/cbpa/econ/boal/research/acc.pdf.
38 See Leslie I. Boden, Underground Coal Mine Accidents and Government Enforcement of
Safety Regulations (Jul. 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology) (on file with DSpace@MIT, available at http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/l1721.1/15744)
(analyzing data from early 1970s); M.M. Connerton, Accident Control Through Regulation: The
1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act Experience (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Har-
vard University) (on file with Harvard University Archives) (analyzing pre-1978 data); Appleton
& Baker, supra note 35, at 140 (analyzing cross-sectional data from 1979).
39 NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 95-96.
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the two studies (by Boden and Connerton) that relied on data from these years. n0
Second, the considerable labor strife that characterized most of the 1970s - in-
cluding periodic strikes and work stoppages - may have had a deleterious effect
on safety at the union mines included in the study sample. Although Appleton
& Baker limit their study of bituminous mining to 1979 on the ground that it
was a "non-strike year," government statistics reveal that 414 bituminous coal
mine strikes took place in that year, and more generally, the national labor-
management climate remained highly adversarial. 41 No subsequent study has
analyzed the relationship between unionism and safety in subsequent decades,
during which labor-management relations became far less contentious. In short,
given the inconclusive nature of existing scholarship, there is little to be gleaned
from the effects of unionization that is of practical value to regulatory policy-
makers.
Only one published article, by Kniesner and Leeth, has sought to exam-
ine the marginal effect of MSHA inspections on coal mine safety in recent dec-
ades.42 Analyzing quarterly mine-level data from 1982 to 1997, the authors
model injury rates as a function of MSHA enforcement measures and mine
size.4 3 After estimating 200 alternative model specifications, they deliberately
relax statistical conventions by selecting the one that casts MSHA's regulatory
impact in the best possible light. The fact that MSHA enforcement carries a
negative and "statistically significant" sign in only one specification suggests
that MSHA may have no marginal deterrence impact at all given current en-
forcement levels. Yet even if one were to accept this "cherry-picked" specifica-
tion at face value, the article contends, the marginal cost of MSHA inspections
still would outweigh their marginal benefits. To their credit, the authors focus
directly on MSHA's regulatory efficacy - a question of vital policy importance
- and frankly concede that they cannot measure MSHA's total impact on miner
safety, only its marginal effect given current enforcement levels." However,
several shortcomings of their empirical model cast doubt on the validity of their
findings. Most importantly, their assumption that variations in the frequency
and/or size of fines and withdrawal orders45 are exogenous measures of differ-
40 Appleton & Baker, supra note 35, at 140.
41 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 12-25. See also Joel Darmstadter, Produc-
tivity Change in U.S. Coal Mining 27-31 (Jul. 1997) (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper
No. 97-40) (on file with authors), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-97-40.pdf.
42 In an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, L. I. Boden, see supra note 38, uses quarterly data
from 1973-75 from the 539 largest underground bituminous coal mines to test whether the data
bears out the theoretical prediction that higher inspection frequency translates into lower injury
rates. The results confirm the negative relationship between inspection frequency and accidents,
although surprisingly, penalties assessed were found to have no significant effect.
43 See Kniesner & Leeth, supra note 14.
44 See id. at 90.
45 Withdrawal orders - in which MSHA orders that miners be withdrawn from part or all of a
mine - are one of the enforcement tools that MSHA may use to correct mine hazards. See MSHA,
Mine Safety and Health Enforcement, http:llwww.msha.gov/mshainfo/factsheetslmshafct4.htm
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ences in "enforcement efforts" across districts seems implausible, given the
highly centralized fashion in which MSHA penalties are assessed.46 Other as-
pects of their methodology are subject to criticism on theoretical and/or empiri-
cal grounds.47 On the basis of this study alone, therefore, it is probably prema-
ture to draw any conclusions regarding the marginal deterrent impact of
MSHA's recent regulatory activity.
Surveyed as a whole, then, past empirical literature on mining regula-
tion - although arguably shedding some light on the impact of regulation in the
immediate aftermath of the Coal Act - has yielded few practical insights into
MSHA's current regulatory practices. The extent to which current levels of
(last visited July 17, 2008) ("In several situations, the law provides that MSHA may order miners
withdrawn from a mine or part of a mine. Some of the most frequent reasons for orders of with-
drawal are 1) imminent danger to the miners; 2) failure to correct a violation within the time al-
lowed; and 3) to protect miners and secure an area after an accident.")
46 By statute, the amount of proposed civil penalties is based on six specific criteria: size of
business, history of operations, degree of negligence, degree of gravity, demonstrated good faith,
and effect of penalty on operator's ability to continue in business. 30 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2007). So-
called "regular assessments" are generated by a computer program, operated by MSHA's national
headquarters, which utilizes a formulaic point scoring system incorporating the above factors.
Under 30 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2007), MSHA may depart from the computer-generated formula and
issue a "special assessment" in particular circumstances enumerated by statute. In such cases,
individual review and determination is undertaken by MSHA's Policy, Systems, and Special
Assessments Office, also located at MSHA's national headquarters. For an overview of MSHA's
organizational hierarchy, download http://www.msha.gov/programs/assess/asmtoutreach06.ppt#3
(last visited Feb. 26, 2008). In effect, therefore, the only potential discretion exercised by individ-
ual inspectors (and enforcement districts) is how many citations and/or withdrawal orders to re-
cord when conducting an inspection; how to rate mines along the six dimensions that are subse-
quently plugged into the statutory formula; and whether to initiate a special assessment process
that may ultimately increase the total magnitude of fines. Although different inspectors may
exercise this discretion in slightly different ways, there is little reason to interpret such differences
as meaningful proxies for enforcement "effort." Nor is there any reason to believe that the way in
which inspectors exercise this limited amount of de facto discretion differs systematically across
enforcement districts. On the contrary, since all MSHA inspectors nationwide are trained at the
National Mine Health and Safety Academy in Beaver, West Virginia, one would expect MSHA
inspection practices to exhibit a high degree of national uniformity. See MSHA, COURSES FOR
MSHA AND THE M[NING INDUSTRY (2008), available at http://www.msha.gov/training/cat.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2008). Therefore, Kniesner and Leeth's central identifying assumption, that
cross-district differences in the level and frequency of fines and withdrawal orders reflect exoge-
nous variations in "enforcement efforts," appears to lack empirical support. See Kniesner &
Leeth, supra note 14, at 89. Under the seemingly more plausible assumption that such variations
reflect cross-district differences in average mine safety levels, they are endogenous with respect to
the dependent variable (injury frequency), and the model is misspecified.
47 For example, in modeling specific deterrence effects, they control for "inspections with
violations," but control for neither the number of citations issued nor the magnitude of fines im-
posed, see Kniesner & Leeth, supra note 14, at 89, both of which one would expect to signifi-
cantly affect inspected mines' future behavior. Moreover, among the array of safety measures that
they use as dependent variables, they apparently do not include the rate of fatal injuries, only the
raw number of fatal injuries. See id. at 97. Since fatalities are the least subject to underreporting
- and one cannot meaningfully compare safety across districts without calculating rates - this
omission also casts doubt on the relevance of their results.
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safety are attributable to regulatory intervention, as well as the extent to which
alternative regulatory practices could bring about further enhancements, remain
open empirical questions.
II1. TAPPING THE RICH RESERVOIR OF HISTORICAL DATA ON U.S. COAL
MINES
A. The Unique Scope of Historical Data on Mining Safety Regulation
What makes the paucity of empirical scholarship on mining regulation
particularly surprising is the wealth of helpful data available. In fact, mining is
the only U.S. industry for which fine-grained historical data are available on all
of the regulatory inputs and outputs of primary interest to policymakers. To
fully appreciate this disparity, it is helpful to compare the availability of mining
data with the availability of data available on other sectors of the regulated
economy. Table 1 presents this comparison for six types of data of vital policy
importance.
Table 1: A Comparison of Data Available on Mining versus Non-Mining
U.S. Industries
Type of Data Mining Other U.S. Industries
Data on Inspections, Viola- Data are publicly Data are publicly
tions, and Penalties available on all U.S. available on all inspected
surface and underground workplaces, but only a
mines, each of which is small proportion of U.S.
inspected by MSHA firms are inspected by
(respectively) at least twice OSHA in any given year.49
or four times per year.48
48 30 C.F.R. Part 50 requires that the above information be collected and made available to the
general public. See MSHA, Accident, Illness and Injury and Employment Self-Extracting Files
(Part 50 Data), http:/lwww.msha.govlstatslpart5O/p5Oy2klp5Oy2k.htm (click on "Accident, Injury
and Illness Information" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
49 For access to the online searchable database, see OSHA, Statistics & Data,
http://www.osha.gov/oshstats/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
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Data on Non-Fatal Data are collected quarterly Summary statistics based
Injuries from all U.S. mines since on survey data (by industry
1983 and are available to and worker demographics)
the public.5 °  are publicly available, but
firm-level microdata are
confidential.5'
Data on Fatalities Data are collected Summary data since 1992
quarterly from all U.S. are available on all occupa-
mines since 1983 and are tional fatalities nationwide,
available to the public, but complete decedent-
level microdata are
confidential.52
Data on Other Accidents Data are collected No establishment-level
quarterly from all U.S. microdata are publicly
mines since 1983 and are available.
available to the public.
Data on Employment Data are collected Industry-level estimates
quarterly from all U.S. based on survey data are
mines since 1983 and are publicly available, but
available to the public, firm-level microdata are
confidential.53
Data on Production and Data are collected Industry-level productivity
Ownership quarterly from all U.S. estimates based on survey
mines since 1983 and are data are publicly available,
available to the public, but establishment-level
microdata are not.54
50 See MSHA, supra note 48.
51 Aggregate tables are available at Bureau of Labor Statistics. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Data-
bases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, http://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm (click on "Workplace
Injuries" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 27, 2008). To use the full microdata from the Survey of
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, researchers must undergo a lengthy application process and
conduct all statistical analysis onsite at the Bureau of Labor Statistics' office in Washington, D.C.
See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Researcher Access to Confidential Data Files at the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/bls/blsresda.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
52 Only summary statistics are available online. Through a special application procedure,
researchers may obtain access to the Offsite CFOI Micro Fatality Research File. See U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Acquiring the Offsite CFOI Micro Fatality Research File,
http://www.bls.gov/iif/cfoioffsite.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2008). However, even this restricted
version of the dataset excludes a number of variables (such as decedent's state of residence) that
may be important for research purposes. To use the full CFOI microdata, researchers must un-
dergo a lengthy application process and conduct all statistical analysis onsite at the Bureau of
Labor Statistics' office in Washington, D.C. See Researcher Access, supra note 51.
53 For a summary of publicly available survey data related to employment available from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, see Tables & Calculators, supra note 51 (follow "Employment" hyper-
link).
54 For a summary of publicly available survey data related to industrial productivity available
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, see id. (follow "Productivity" hyperlink).
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The disparities revealed in Table I are striking. For the mining indus-
try, comprehensive historical microdata on inspections, violations, penalties,
nonfatal injuries, fatalities, accidents, employment, production, and ownership
are available for all U.S. mines. In contrast, the only establishment-level micro-
data that are publicly available for other U.S. industries are inspection, violation,
and penalty records pertaining to OSHA inspections, which affect only a small
fraction of the regulated economy in any given year.
B. How Analyzing Historical Data Could Shed New Light on U.S. Mining
Regulation
The implications of the above disparities for policy analysis are pro-
found. Although the empirical literature on the effect of OSHA regulation is
significantly more extensive than the mining-related scholarship summarized
above, the paucity of available data on the OSHA-regulated economy has con-
strained scholars' ability to address key policy questions. For example, since
BLS injury data are not collected from every non-mining firm in every year,
those scholars examining the effect of OSHA inspections on establishment-level
injury rates have been forced to focus on large firms simply because they are the
ones most likely to be included in the BLS stratified sampling frame.5 5 Simi-
larly, since firm-level data on production and ownership structures are unavail-
able for most sectors of the economy, attempts to probe the potential relevance
of such factors in the regulatory context have been virtually nonexistent.56
In contrast, it is possible to probe a number of important policy issues
that bear on the efficacy of mining regulation using data readily obtainable from
MSHA's internal database. Such studies could shed light not only on the his-
55 Even to undertake this type of analysis is enormously labor-intensive, since it requires re-
searchers to obtain access to confidential microdata housed at the Bureau of Labor Statistics, all
data must be analyzed onsite, and matching OSHA inspection data to BLS injury data presents
formidable programming challenges. See, e.g., Wayne B. Gray & John M. Mendeloff, The De-
clining Effects of OSHA Inspections on Manufacturing Injuries, 1979-1998, 58 INDUs. & LAB.
REL. REv. 571, 575 (2005) (noting in data description that large manufacturing establishments are
over-represented because of necessity of obtaining data for consecutive years, and alluding to
complex probabilistic methodology used to match OSHA to BLS records using name and address
fields); Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Does Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel Analysis
of OSHA Enforcement, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 177, 185 (1993) (noting that only plants included in
BLS injury survey from 1979 to 1985 were examined).
56 To date, only one scholar has compiled the data necessary to probe the relevance of com-
mon ownership structure in the context of OSHA enforcement. See David Weil, Assessing OSHA
Performance: New Evidence from the Construction Industry, 20 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
651, 654 (2001) (explaining that in order to create a longitudinal panel of national construction
contractors that would enable one to match construction projects to their respective national firms
and obtain a measure of annual revenues, a list of the top 2060 contractors was compiled from a
trade publication and then matched to OSHA data). See also Alison D. Morantz, Has Devolution
Injured American Workers? State and Federal Enforcement of Construction Safety, 25 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2009) (noting that a section of empirical analysis relies on dataset
originally assembled by David Weil).
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torical effects of regulation, but also help define the most promising channels
for regulatory innovation and the embedded constraints that may limit regula-
tory efficacy.
To gain insight into the deterrent effect of MSHA regulation, one could
examine quarterly mine-level data on inspections, penalties, injuries, and fatali-
ties in recent decades; develop models designed to test the relationships between
them; and explore whether such relationships have changed over time. To make
plausible inferences about causation, one would need to identify changes in the
enforcement structure that are plausibly exogenous with respect to mine-level
safety, the outcome of chief policy interest.5 7 To explore general deterrence
effects, one might exploit the fact that the statutory level of penalties imposed
for particular violations has been periodically altered since the 1990s, and exam-
ine whether such changes in the enforcement structure triggered broad changes
in patterns of firm compliance and/or injuries. 58 Alternatively, one might ex-
plore whether the duration or frequency of inspections has varied across districts
or across time for reasons that are uncorrelated with differences in underlying
safety levels. Isolating "specific deterrence" effects of MSHA inspections, i.e.,
the effect on firm behavior of actually undergoing an inspection, poses unique
challenges. The very fact that all U.S. mines are inspected multiple times per
year (unlike the rest of the economy, in which only a small minority of firms are
inspected) makes it challenging to find a "basis for comparison" against which
to measure the effects of undergoing an inspection. A number of empirical
strategies could be tried. For example, one might compare similarly-situated
firms found guilty of the same violation just before and just after a hike in pen-
alties, to determine whether being assessed the higher penalty materially affects
inspected firms' subsequent behavior. Alternatively, one could use exogenous
differences in the timing and/or duration of inspections throughout the calendar
year to probe whether being inspected sooner (or longer) is positively correlated
with a mine's injury record.59
But examining the deterrence effects of MSHA enforcement is only one
way in which empirical research could shed light on current regulatory prac-
tices. Just as important, data analysis could help illuminate the background
conditions that constrain the potential impact of regulatory intervention. For
example, the efficacy of regulatory intervention is premised on the existence of
57 As noted earlier, the primary methodological shortcoming of the Kniesner and Leeth study
is that their measures of cross-district variations in enforcement "effort" are unlikely to be exoge-
nous with respect to safety, the dependent variable in their empirical models. See supra note 46.
58 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, an internal revision to the MSHA penalty
structure in 1992, and more importantly, the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response
Act of 2006 (MINER Act) all changed the pre-existing structure of fines in one or more ways.
59 Interestingly, based on the results of a "resident inspector program" implemented during the
latter 1970s, Braithwaite concludes that "having an inspector reside full-time at the mine" - an
extreme form of specific deterrence - was responsible for transforming mines with poor safety
records into ones that had (in most years) injury rates significantly below the national average.
See BRArrIWArrE, supra note 36, at 83-84.
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two causal relationships: that inspections improve compliance; and that higher
compliance, in turn, enhances worker safety. Critics have long questioned the
second assumption, i.e., the extent to which higher compliance with bureau-
cratic regulations - some of which may bear little obvious link to safety out-
comes - truly yields higher safety levels.6° Given the data constraints noted
above, it is not possible to comprehensively examine the relationship between
compliance and safety for most U.S. industries. Given the rich microdata avail-
able on mining outcomes, however, one could examine in comprehensive fash-
ion the degree of correlation between regulatory compliance and various meas-
ures of miner safety - not only for the industry as a whole, but for different
types of mines, injuries, and regulations. Even without drawing definitive con-
clusions regarding cause-and-effect, such fine-grained analysis could provide a
more nuanced portrait of the relationship between compliance and safety. For
example, if mines committing certain patterns of violations are demonstrably
more likely to sustain particular sorts of injuries, then compliance with such
regulations is likely to be a meaningful proxy for (and, possibly, contributor to)
safety in these areas. Conversely, if there is little or no correlation between
compliance in some areas and the safety outcomes which they are designed to
promote, one might question the value of such regulations in achieving their
desired ends.
In light of the recent tragic events at the Sago, Darby, 61 and Crandall
Canyon62 coal mines, another advantageous line of inquiry might be to focus on
60 For example, in the early 1970s, the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration
(MSHA's predecessor) issued regulations requiring toilet manufacturers and mine operators to
seek approval for each sanitary toilet installed in an underground or surface coal mine. See
Underground Sanitary Facilies; Installation and Maintenance, 35 Fed. Reg. 17927 (promulgated
Nov. 20, 1970) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 75.1712-6); Sanitary Toilet Facilities at Surface Work
Sites; Installation Requirements, 37 Fed. Reg. 6372 (promulgated Mar. 28, 1972) (codified at 30
C.F.R. § 71.500). Under these regulations - which remained in effect for more than thirty years -
MSHA and/or NIOSH reviewed each individual application for approval using criteria drawn
from the American National Standard Institute's (ANSI's) American National Standard for
Sanitation - Nonsewered Waste-Disposal Systems - Minimum Requirements. Not until 2003 did
MSHA remove the formal application requirement and its associated paperwork burden. Without
changing the substantive standards, MSHA simply made public the criteria required for approval.
See Standards for Sanitary Toilets in Coal Mines, 68 Fed. Reg. 37082-87 (June 23, 2003)
(amending 30 C.F.R. §§ 71.500, 75.1712-6), available at http://www.epa.gov/EPA-
IMPACT/2003/June/Day-23/i15813.htm. See also EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN,
GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982) (arguing that
strategy of demanding inflexible, uniform adherence to inefficient regulations is ultimately coun-
terproductive in promoting desired regulatory ends).
61 On May 20, 2006, five miners died in the wake of an explosion at Darby Mine in Harlan
County, Kentucky. See Fact Sheet 95-8, supra note 3.
62 On August 6, 2007, the collapse of Crandall Canyon Mine in Emery County, Utah, caused
the deaths of six miners (and, subsequently, of three rescue workers). See Fact Sheet 95-8, supra
note 3; MSHA, GENWAL RESOURCES INC[.] CRANDALL CANYON MINE[,] MINE ID: 4201715, avail-
able at http://www.msha.gov/GenwallCrandallCanyonupdates.asp (last visited July 17, 2008)
(noting that on Friday, August 17th, at 8 a.m. EDT, "[t]hree rescue workers are confirmed dead"
and "all rescue efforts have been suspended.").
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the distribution of multi-fatality mining disasters. If such major accidents are
random events - perhaps triggered by a confluence of human error and unpre-
dictable environmental conditions - then it would be unfair to hold MSHA re-
sponsible for failing to deter them, and unwise for MSHA to devote any special
resources or programs to preventing them (at least beyond the level already be-
ing expended). On the other hand, if empirical analysis revealed major mine
disasters to be statistically predictable, then it is possible that MSHA could do
more to anticipate and deter them from occurring. 63 In this manner, statistical
modeling could help MSHA forecast which arenas for potential regulatory re-
finements are the most likely to result in concrete improvements.
In short, the wealth of microdata available on U.S. mines presents poli-
cymakers with a unique opportunity to peer inside the "black box" of regulation.
Careful analysis of historical data could not only shed light on the potency of
today's regulations and enforcement techniques, but could also help MSHA
identify the most promising areas for future experimentation.
IV. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TARGETED REGULATION
Besides analyzing historical data in the manner described above, MSHA
could put its vast data repository to an even more important and innovative use.
By developing algorithms to identify high-risk mines - algorithms which could
be updated in "real time" as new mine-level information was amassed each
quarter - officials could proactively seek to prevent major mining accidents
before they occur. In short, MSHA could design a statistically-based strategy of
"targeted" enforcement to augment (and, ideally, synergistically enhance) its
current inspection activity. In the remainder of this Article, I will briefly sketch
the theory behind regulatory targeting, highlight other governmental settings in
which it has been applied, and describe how MSHA might use this approach to
enhance safety and health in U.S. mines.
A. Theoretical Background
Theories of targeted regulation usually rest on most, if not all, of four
assumptions. 64 First, regulatory agencies are resource-constrained, and there-
63 In twenty-five of thirty-nine disasters from five countries (including 19 from the United
States), Braithwaite concludes that serious violations "either caused the disaster, were among the
causes, or made the disaster worse than it would have been without the violations."
BRArrWArrE, supra note 36, at 75-76. For purposes of this analysis, a mining "disaster" is de-
fined as an incident in which five or more persons lose their lives. Id. at 15. Based in part on this
evidence, Braithwaite argues that "if there were 100 percent compliance with coal mine laws, the
majority of miners who die in coal mines would be saved." Id. at 75.
64 The term "targeted enforcement" is historically evolving; to date, there is no universally
accepted definition. Indeed, many of the theoretical articles described or cited here as models of
targeted enforcement do not contain the word "targeting" or "targeted." I use the term here sim-
ply as a convenient shorthand, to describe the regulatory approach that is the subject of this Arti-
cle, and the reader should bear in mind that other authors' usage of the term may differ from mine.
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fore, it is impractical for them to continuously monitor all of the entities within
their statutory purview. Second, once a given standard is set,65 the agency's
paramount goal is to minimize total production of the social ill that the standard
is designed to deter (or alternatively, to maximize industry-wide compliance
with the regulatory standard, which may be the best available proxy). 66 Third,
not all regulated entities are the same. 67 Since different firms' costs of compli-
ance and other characteristics (e.g., internal culture, rate of discounting, risk
aversion, etc.) differ, they are likely to respond differently to the same set of
policy stimuli. Finally, the interaction between agency bureaucrats and in-
spected entities typically extends over a lengthy (if not indefinite) time horizon,
with multiple opportunities for the inspector to evaluate each firm's compliance,
65 As Viscusi and Zeckhauser note, there is an important policy tradeoff between the strin-
gency of standard-setting and the likelihood of noncompliance. The higher the standard, the
higher the fraction of firms that will choose not to comply. Therefore, at some point increasing
the stringency of a standard is likely to actually lower overall compliance with a given regulation.
Although this insight highlights the importance of setting standards at the "right" level at the
outset, it does not negate the imperative to maximize the level of compliance achieved for any
given standard and level of enforcement expenditure. See W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeck-
hauser, Optimal Standards with Incomplete Enforcement, 27 PUB. POL'Y 438 (1979).
66 Whether or not regulatory agencies should seek to maximize societal efficiency by explicitly
taking into account the costs of compliance borne by regulated entities - and inducing the industry
as a whole to bear these costs in the most cost-efficient way - remains controversial. In general,
requiring that regulatory policy meet this additional test significantly complicates models of tar-
geted regulation. See, e.g., Jon D. Harford, Measurement Error and State-Dependent Control
Enforcement, 21 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 67, 77 (1991) (noting that state-dependent enforce-
ment models, of the sort described in the paper, violate the cost-minimizing principle since firms
with identical abatement costs are treated differently); Jon D. Harford & Winston Harrington, A
Reconsideration of Enforcement Leverage When Penalties Are Restricted, 45 J. PUB. ECON. 391,
395 (1991) (concluding, in a similar vein, that "state-dependent enforcement remains a second-
best strategy in a world in which standards are set in a separate decision from the monitoring
strategy").
67 Although listed here as a general feature of "targeting" models, the third assumption (that
firms are heterogeneous with respect to their costs of compliance and other characteristics) is not
universal. A well-developed class of game-theoretic models, although sharing the other assump-
tions listed above and implying that regulatory agencies should "target" firms based on past be-
havior, nevertheless assumes that firms have homogenous cost functions. See Lana Friesen, Tar-
geting Enforcement to Improve Compliance with Environmental Regulations, 46 J. ENVTL. ECON.
& MGMT. 72, 74 (2003) (proposes similar targeting scheme to that proposed by Harrington, but
assuming that firms are moved randomly into target group); Joseph Greenberg, Avoiding Tax
Avoidance: A (Repeated) Game-Theoretic Approach, 32 J. ECON. THEORY 1, 9 (1984) (describing
optimal auditing scheme to detect tax avoidance, which subsequent theorists adapt to context of
environmental regulation); William Harrington, Enforcement Leverage When Penalties Are Re-
stricted, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 29, 34-35 (1988) (applying logic of Greenberg's model to enforcement
of environmental regulations); Clifford S. Russell, Game Models for Structuring Monitoring and
Enforcement Systems, 4 NAT. RES. MODELING 143, 159 (1990) (proposing similar targeting strat-
egy as Harrington); Harford & Harrington, supra note 66, at 392 (1991) (noting that since model
causes otherwise identical firms to emit different levels of a pollutant, it does not minimize ab-
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and multiple opportunities for the firm to choose a future course of action in
light of past experience and new information.
In light of these assumptions, the essence of targeted enforcement is the
agency's capacity and willingness to "tailor" its enforcement strategy - the
probability of inspection, the size of penalties, and so forth - to regulated enti-
ties' past inspection history and/or other observable characteristics. In other
words, as one scholar has put it, "[tiargeting is the practice of inspecting firms
most likely to violate a regulation," 68 as opposed to a one-size-fits-all strategy in
which inspection probabilities, penalties, etc., are all applied uniformly across
the entire regulated industry. Although differing widely in their methodological
assumptions, targeting models imply that for any given budget constraint, an
optimally designed targeting strategy maximizes the industry-wide rate of com-
pliance. 69 At the outset, the agency's goal is to divide regulated entities into
different types based on each one's relative likelihood of compliance.70 Then by
subjecting the "high-risk" firms to a more stringent enforcement regime than the
"low-risk" types, the agency can strive to equalize the marginal rates of non-
compliance across different firm types.7' By targeting firms in this manner, the
68 Eric Helland, The Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, and Self-
Reporting, 80 REv. ECON. & STAT. 141, 141 (1998).
69 Id. at 141. For class of models relying on game-theoretic structure and assuming identical
firms' abatement cost functions, see sources cited supra note 67. There are other models resting
on various alternative assumptions but sharing this key implication. See, e.g., Helland, supra note
68, at 152 (1998) (proposing model in which targeting produces more cooperation in form of self-
reporting); Anthony Heyes & Neil Rickman, Regulatory Dealing - Revisiting the Harrington
Paradox, 72 J. PUB. ECON. 361, 363 (1999) (arguing that model that incorporates "horizontal"
regulatory dealing, in which agency and firm interact in multiple domains, is consistent with a
targeting model that maximizes net regulatory effectiveness); John Livernois & C. J. McKenna,
Truth or Consequences: Enforcing Pollution Standards with Self-Reporting, 71 J. PuB. ECON. 415,
437 (1999) (similarly proposes that when prior models are extended to include self-reporting
requirement, it's not surprising that compliance rates are so high despite low penalties); A. Mit-
chell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders, 46 J. PuB.
ECON. 291, 292 (1991) (model suggesting that under certain assumptions, repeat criminal offend-
ers should be punished more severely if they have higher "offense propensities"). Importantly,
however, targeting models do not necessarily minimize the total abatement cost for a given reduc-
tion in pollution or other externalities. See Harford & Harrington, supra note 66, at 394-95; Har-
ford, supra note 66, at 77.
70 For an example of a model that relaxes this assumption - assuming, instead, that the regula-
tor does not known individual firms' compliance costs - see Mark Raymond, Enforcement Lever-
age When Penalties are Restricted: A Reconstruction Under Asymmetric Information, 73 J. PUB.
ECON. 289 (1999).
71 See Devon Garvie & Andrew Keeler, Incomplete Enforcement with Endogenous Regulatory
Choice, 55 J. PUB. ECON. 141, 158 (1994) (targeting model in which firms with higher abatement
costs - who are the least likely to comply with regulations - received a larger fraction of regula-
tory resources and face higher penalties than firms with lower abatement costs); Nicola Persico &
Petra Todd, Using Hit Rate Tests for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement: Vehicle Searches in Wich-
ita 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10947, 2004) (in racial profiling
model of vehicle searches, efficient targeting in absence of biased preferences implies that "hit
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agency can achieve the highest possible rate of compliance for any given level
of expenditure.
A key feature of targeting models that deserves special attention is the
importance of information. Without credible information about the past behav-
ior (or other pertinent characteristics) of inspected firms, targeting would be a
fruitless endeavor. The more extensive and high-quality the data available to a
regulatory agency, the more accurately it can differentiate among firms, and
therefore the greater the potential efficacy of targeted enforcement methods.
B. Prior Applications to U.S. Regulated Economy
The application of targeted enforcement techniques by state and federal
regulatory agencies is far from unprecedented. On the contrary, a diverse array
of public agencies have embraced targeting principles in recent decades and
used them to help prioritize the deployment of regulatory resources.
Perhaps the most well-known example of targeted enforcement among
U.S. municipalities is the COMPSTAT (computerized statistics) philosophy of
targeted law enforcement developed by New York City Chief of Police William
Bratton in 1994, and subsequently replicated in a number of other U.S. metro-
politan areas. One of the hallmarks of the COMPSTAT approach is the analysis
of detailed, real-time data on crime trends at the precinct, patrol borough, and
city-wide levels. By analyzing such data at frequent intervals, the agency's top
management can rapidly identify crime "hot spots" as they emerge, and deploy
enforcement resources towards those regions that pose the greatest relative
crime risk.72 Although not without its skeptics, 73 COMPSTAT has been widely
credited with significantly reducing crime rates in many of the cities in which it
has been applied.74
Targeted enforcement principles have also become well established
among a number of federal regulatory agencies. The Environmental Protection
Agency, for example, has recently implemented a comprehensive effort to "tar-
get [its] efforts to areas of greatest need," including analysis of compli-
rates" for finding contraband goods should be equalized across all observable categories of driv-
ers).
72 See, e.g. James J. Willis et al., Compstat in Practice: an In-Depth Analysis of Three Cities,
POUCE FOUNDATION (2003), available at
http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/compstatinpractice.pdf; Philadelphia Police Dep't: Comp-
Stat Process, http://www.ppdonline.org/hq-compstat.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2008); Encyclopedia
Britannica Online, Police: Compstat, http://www.britannica.comleb/article-260923/police (click
on "The history of policing in the West" hyperlink under "Table of Contents" sidebar; click on
"Compstat" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2008).
73 See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that
Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 163, 172-73 (2004) (arguing
that the impact of policing strategies on national crime rates during the 1990s was probably "mi-
nor").
74 See Encyclopedia Britannica Online, supra note 72.
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ance/enforcement history and pollutant emissions of regulated entities, analysis
of sector-based trends, and risk-based predictions of the relative environment
effects of different regulated facilities.75 A 1995 empirical study of U.S. air
pollution regulation confirmed that EPA enforcement patterns in this area were
broadly consistent with a targeting model of enforcement, in which enforcement
of integrated steel firms was influenced by plant-level characteristics and behav-
or. The fact that federal programs have been criticized in recent years for not
allocating inspection resources based on quantitative risk assessments suggests
that targeted enforcement may be becoming the presumptive norm among those
agencies for which such methods are technologically feasible.77
All three of the primary regulatory agencies within the U.S. Department
of Labor - OSHA, MSHA, and the Employment Standards Administration
(ESA) - have pursued targeted-enforcement initiatives in recent years. For ex-
ample, ESA's Wage and Hour Division, which enforces the federal minimum
wage and overtime laws, is currently engaged in an ongoing effort (begun in
75 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE
(2201 A), PROTECTING YOUR HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO
COMPLIANCE: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE PAST 5 YEARS 20 (1999). The publication reads, in pertinent
part, as follows:
Effective compliance ... [is] also dependent on effective targeting of the most
significant public health and environmental risks. Because of this and a rec-
ognition that government resources are finite, EPA has worked since the reor-
ganization to improve our ability to target our efforts to areas of greatest need.
EPA has enhanced these targeted approaches by using a broad array of envi-
ronmental quality information, demographics, and information on the results
of our compliance monitoring activities. We target our enforcement and com-
pliance assistance efforts taking into account:
" sector-based environmental problems or compliance patterns;
" statute-specific compliance problems; and
" an analysis of compliance/enforcement history and pollutant releases
New methods of examining these data incorporate risk considerations, which
predict the relative effects of facilities, or groups of facilities, on the human
population.
When targeting is effective and violations are identified, the process of bring-
ing the violators back into compliance can result in significant impacts on
human health and the environment.
76 Wayne B. Gray & Mary E. Deily, Compliance and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation
in the U.S. Steel Industry, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 96, 110 (1996).
77 See Benjamin M. Simon et al., Allocating Scarce Resources for Endangered Species Recov-
ery, 14 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 415, 423, 430 (1995) (criticizing Fish and Wildlife Service
for not using Priority Ranking System - designed to quantify relative risks faced by particular
species - as basis for budgetary allocations); Henry H. Willis, Guiding Resource Allocations
Based on Terrorism Risk § 3 (RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, Working
Paper No. WR-371-CTRMP) (March 2006), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/working-papers/WR371 (critiquing the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity's Urban Area Security Initiative for not allocating funds in proportion to relative levels of
terrorism risk faced by different metropolitan areas).
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2005) to target its limited inspection resources more effectively. 78 A primary
focus on the project has been to "develop[] a methodology for determining low-
wage industries with the highest potential for violations, and analyze[] the rela-
tionship between violation and complaint rates in order to strengthen targeted
enforcement activities. 79 Using statistical evaluations and audits by external
contractors, the agency sought to identify those groups of establishments affect-
ing low-wage workers most likely to violate wage and hour laws. By 2007,
empirical analysis conducted at the agency's behest by Boston University and
an independent consulting firm revealed that among fast-food establishments,
franchisees generally had worse safety records than their company-owned coun-
terparts, indicating that fast-food franchisees should become a primary focus of
WHD enforcement activity. 0
Among the most mature and extensive targeting programs within the
Department of Labor is OSHA's Site-Specific Targeting (SST) program, whose
goal is to "direct enforcement resources to those workplaces where the highest
rate of injuries and illness have occurred."'', Beginning in 1999, the program
has relied on establishment-level survey data of large employers in historically
high-injury industries. Based on its injury rate in prior years, each firm is as-
signed to a primary, secondary, or tertiary inspection list. Once the lists are
compiled, federal OSHA inspectors nationwide use these lists to prioritize pro-
grammed inspections among non-construction workplaces. Only after inspect-
ing all sites on the primary list may an OSHA area office proceed to the secon-
dary list, and only after completing the secondary list may inspectors move on
to the tertiary list.82 Besides the SST program, OSHA also uses national and
local "emphasis" programs to target specific hazards and industries deemed to
pose the greatest risks.83 Although the latter programs only encompass states
under OSHA's regulatory purview, states that conduct their own enforcement
78 See U.S. Dep't of Labor, DOL Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2005 Performance and Account-
ability Report: Outcome Goal 2.1 - Increase Compliance with Worker Protection Laws,
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/annual2005/SG2.htm#1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) ("WHD
continues to evaluate performance measures in low wage industries, focusing on developing mod-
els for common compliance strategies across low-wage industries.").
79 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ANNUAL REPORT (2006) PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT - STRATEGIC GOAL 2: A SECURE WORKFORCE, PERFORMANCE GOAL 06-
2.IA (ESA), available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/annual2006/SG2.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 3, 2008).
80 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ANNUAL REPORT (2007) PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT - STRATEGIC GOAL 3: SAFE AND SECURE WORKPLACES, Performance
Goal 07-3C (ESA), 130-133, available at
http://www.dol.govlsec/media/reports/annual2007/SG3.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
81 See OSHA Directive 07-03 (CPS 02) - Site-Specific Targeting 2007, § IX (A), available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document?p-table=DIRECTIVES&p-id=3549
(last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
92 See id., at Part XII.
83 See id., at Part IX (A).
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under Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 197084 ("state
plan" states) have also developed innovative and highly detailed methods of
targeting high-risk workplaces using workers compensation data and other site-
specific information on past compliance and injuries.
Although MSHA has not implemented formal agency-wide targeting
programs like those used by its sister agency, for decades it has implicitly rec-
ognized the value of singling out those mines likely to pose the greatest hazards
for special regulatory scrutiny. For example, two of the six criteria used to cal-
culate penalties through the regular assessment process are "the operator's his-
tory of previous violations" and "the demonstrated good faith of the operator in
attempting to achieve rapid compliance after notification of a violation." 86 In
effect, then, mines whose poor prior inspection history and/or apparent lack of
good faith suggest a high likelihood of future violations are penalized more
heavily than their lower-risk counterparts. In amending Section 110 of the Mine
Act, the MINER Act of 2006 further enhanced MSHA's ability to target non-
compliant mines. Under a new provision, any operator who "willfully" violates
a regulation (or refuses to comply with certain orders) may be fined up to
$250,000 and/or jailed for up to one year, and repeat violators may be fined up
to $500,000 and jailed for up to five years.87 Through its state grant program,
MSHA has also helped to fund special emphasis programs intended to target
mines and categories of mine workers deemed to be at the greatest risk of inju-
ries."
As these illustrative examples suggest, the concept of regulatory target-
ing is anything but novel. Rather, what distinguishes the last several decades
from earlier periods is the increasing sophistication with which public agencies
have brought these principles to bear on real-world problems. Instead of relying
on rudimentary "rules of thumb" to identify high-risk groups, public agencies
84 See 29 U.S.C. § 667 (2000) (OSHA "opt-out" provision).
85 OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHSA REPORT ENFORCEMENT: TARGETING HIGH-RISK
WORKSITES (2001), available at
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/oshspa/2001 _report/enforcement.htmil.
86 See MSHA, U.S. Dep't of Labor,: Categories of Civil Penalties,
http://www.msha.gov/PROGRAMS/ASSESS5.HTM (summarizing provisions of 30 CFR 100).
87 MINER Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-236, § 8 (a)(1)(B) (2006).
88 Authorized by the Coal Act, the program provides approved states with the funds required
to provide specialized health and safety training to resident miners. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
U.S. LABOR DEPARTMENT'S MSHA ISSUES INCREASED FUNDING FOR STATE HEALTH AND SAFETY
TRAINING GRANTS (2008), available at
http://www.msha.gov/MEDIA/PRESS/2008/NR080310.asp. For an example of an individual
state grant program, see, e.g., MSHA STATE GRANT PROGRAM - COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS PROGRAM SUMMARY, available at
http://www.msha.gov/TRAINING/STATES/MASTATE.asp (describing special emphasis pro-
gram that targets mining operations with higher accident experiences and mines with histories of
uncorrected mine safety and health violations for consultative health and safety site inspections,
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have increasingly relied upon computer-aided statistical modeling techniques to
generate nuanced predictions of the relative risks posed by individual regulated
entities. In so doing, they have been aided immeasurably by technological ad-
vances that facilitate the collection, storage and analysis of detailed data on dif-
ferent characteristics of the regulated economy.
V. How REGULATORS COULD USE INSPECTION AND SAFETY DATA TO TARGET
HIGH-RISK MINES
As argued above, a necessary component of targeted regulation is the
capacity for an agency to meaningfully distinguish among regulated firms. The
more accurate and extensive the data available to inspectors, the greater their
potential ability to forecast the level of risk posed by different establishments,
and therefore the more fruitful targeting-based enforcement techniques are like-
ly to be. Given the singularly rich and extensive historical data available to
MSHA, mining safety regulation seems like a particularly promising arena in
which to apply to targeted enforcement techniques.
Nevertheless, the mere availability of high-quality data does not ensure
that computer-based targeting will be a practical or effective alternative in any
given regulatory environment. To serve as an effective enforcement tool, a tar-
geting strategy must satisfy two additional criteria: it must rely on a sound sta-
tistical methodology, and its implementation must be both politically and eco-
nomically feasible. Therefore, in this final section, I suggest how MSHA might
develop a targeted enforcement strategy that meets these additional criteria.
A. Designing a Targeting Protocol: Methodological Challenges
At a minimum, a targeting protocol must employ statistical methodolo-
gies to generate credible predictions about which mines pose the gravest risks in
future periods, based on the analysis of available historical data. To be of prac-
tical value to MSHA inspectors, moreover, a protocol ideally should: (1) enable
analysts, when confronted with empirical uncertainties about cause and effect,
to directly and readily calculate the probability of each hypothesis upon which
the targeting model relies; (2) allow MSHA, when appropriate, to fully utilize
pre-existing knowledge and expert opinion about mining safety; (3) make it easy
to update the targeting model in a statistically principled manner as new data are
acquired, without requiring MSHA to analyze the entire dataset anew; and (4)
anticipate the possibility that the criteria most useful for targeting purposes (for
technological or other reasons) may shift over time.
The branch of empirical methodologies ideally suited for the above task
is known as Bayesian statistics (or Bayesian econometrics).89 Unlike classical
89 This branch of statistical methodology is named after Thomas Bayes (1702-1761), an Eng-
lish minister and mathematician who "was the first to use probability inductively and who estab-
lished a mathematical basis for probability inference." Thomas Bayes, ENCYCLOPEDIA
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or "frequentist" approaches, Bayesian methodologies meet all of the require-
ments mentioned above. First, Bayesian approaches enable one to calculate
directly the probability of hypotheses whose empirical validity is uncertain, a
task for which the classical framework is not as well suited.9° Second, Bayesian
methodologies permit policymakers to build prior knowledge and expertise di-
rectly into the modeling framework, which is otherwise difficult to achieve. 9'
Third, the Bayesian approach is inherently dynamic, in the sense that models
can be continuously updated as new information is accrued, without requiring
the analyst to periodically "re-run" the entire model.92 Finally, Bayesian models
can readily account for potential "regime changes" by including time-varying
coefficients.93 Bayesian "time series" methods are particularly well suited to the
type of forecasting that regulatory targeting requires, since they are designed to
handle situations like that confronting MSHA officials, in which researchers
must use historical data on individual agents' past behavior to predict future
behavior.94
Given their significant practical advantages, Bayesian statistical meth-
ods have become well established across a wide range of fields in recent years.95
Practical applications of such methods of have helped to further such diverse
practical endeavors as the identification of medical drug interactions, 96 gene
profiling,97 the conduct of clinical and evaluation of health care outcomes,
98
BRITANNICA ONLINE (2008), available at
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/56807Thomas-Bayes.
90 See, e.g., JAMES 0. BERGER, STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY AND BAYESIAN ANALYSIS 119-
20 (2006) (describing Bayesian approaches' superior capacity to make direct probability state-
ments about uncertainty).
91 See, e.g., id. at 118-119 (arguing that Bayesian approaches more readily allow researcher to
take advantage of significant prior information when it is available); TONY LANCASTER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO MODERN BAYESIAN ECONOMETRICS 5-6 (2004) (describing way in which prior
beliefs about probability are interpreted in context of Bayes' theorem).
92 See MIKE WEST & JEFF HARRISON, BAYESIAN FORECASTING AND DYNAMIC MODELS 23-25
(1997) (describing way in which information is progressively updated in dynamic Bayesian mod-
els); see also LANCASTER, supra note 91, at 6 (providing example of how application of Bayes'
theorem may cause a researcher to change his or her prior belief about the relative likelihoods of
two competing models).
93 See WEST & HARRISON, supra note 92, at 24 (noting that indexing of 0, by t in dynamic
models implies that parameters may change over time, for example, when "influential factors
affecting the time series process" are themselves unstable).
94 See id. at 28-31 (historical overview of application of Bayesian methodologies to dynamic
forecasting).
95 See Jeff Stmad, Should Legal Empiricists Go Bayesian?, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 195, 195
(2007).
96 See, e.g., William DuMouchel, Bayesian Data Mining in Large Frequency Tables, with an
Application to the FDA Spontaneous Reporting System, 53 AM. STATISTICIAN 177 (1999).
97 See, e.g., Sampsa Hautaniemi et al., A Novel Strategy for Microarray Quality Control Using
Bayesian Networks, 19 BIOINFORMATICS 2031 (2003).
2008]
25
Morantz: Mining Mining Data: Bringing Empirical Analysis to Bear on the Re
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW




MSHA itself has, in fact, already recognized the potential value of
Bayesian techniques in targeting high-risk mines. In the early 1980s, an MSHA
official with statistical expertise used Bayesian quality control methods to gen-
erate "control charts" identifying individual mines with anomalously high pat-
terns of injuries. 0 3 However, the success of the initiative was hampered by a
number of practical constraints, such as significant time lags between the occur-
rence and reporting of accidents, difficulties in integrating mine-level inspection
records into MSHA's injury database, and the awkwardness of translating the
algorithms upon which the control charts relied into flexible computer applica-
tions. Consequently, this pioneering effort was ultimately abandoned.'04
In the last decade, however, many of these technological barriers have
eased significantly. Not only has the MINER Act greatly enhanced MSHA's
ability to collect real-time injury data,105 but the database upon which the agency
now relies enables one to examine the inspection and injury history of each U.S.
98 See, e.g., D.J SPIEGELHALTER & MYLES K. ABRAMS, BAYESIAN APPROACHES TO CLINICAL
TRIALS AND HEALTH CARE EVALUATION (2004).
99 See, e.g., M.A.J.S. VAN BOEKEL ET AL., BAYESIAN STATISTICS AND QUALITY MODELING IN
THE AGRO-FOOD PRODUCTION CHAIN (2004).
1oo See, e.g., Jonathan H. Wright, Bayesian Model Averaging and Exchange Rate Forecasts
(FRB International Finance, Discussion Paper No. 779, September 2003), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract--457345.
101 See, e.g., M. Sahami, et. al., A Bayesian Approach to Filtering Junk Email., AAAI Workshop
on Learning for Text Categorization (AA Technical Rep., WS-98-05, 1998), available at
ftp://ftp.research.microsoft.com/pub/ejh/junkfilter.pdf.
102 See, e.g., Theofanis Darsinos & S.E. Satchell, Bayesian Forecasting of Options Prices: A
Natural Framework for Pooling Historical and Implied Volatility Information (Cambridge Work-
ing Papers in Econ. No. 0116, 2001).
103 See JON KOGuT, MSHA, COMPUTER PROGRAMS FOR STATISTICAL GRAPHICS IN SAFETY
ANALYSIS 10-14 (1982) (describing dynamic control charts, which monitor processes' statistical
variations), available from National Mine Health and Safety Academy Library, Beaver, W.Va.
25813; JON KOGUT, AN EMPIRICAL BAYES METHODOLOGY FOR ACCIDENT RISK ESTIMATION AND
INCIDENCE RATE COMPARISON (1981), HSAC Report No. 1MC, available from MSHA Health
and Safety Analysis Center, P.O. Box 25367, Denver, Colo. 80225; JON KOGUT, EMPIRICAL
BAYES ESTIMATION FOR POISSON PROCESSES WITH SKEWED EXPOSURES (1981), in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, SOC. STAT. SECTION, 346-49.
104 Telephone Interview with George Fesak, Director of MSHA's Program Evaluation & Info.
Res. Office (Oct. 19, 2007); Telephone Interview with Jonathan Kogut, former Mathematical
Statistician, MSHA's Program Evaluation & Info. Res. Office (Oct. 24, 2007).
105 See Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act), P.L.
109-236, 2006 S. 2803 § 5(a) (amending section 1030) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977 to require that mine operators report within fifteen minutes deaths as well as injuries or
entrapments that may reasonably cause deaths).
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mine in an integrated fashion.' °6 Meanwhile, given recent advancement in com-
puting technology, the translation of Bayesian models into user-friendly, auto-
mated computer programs has become much more tractable. 0 7 In short - per-
haps for the first time in MSHA's history - it is now both methodologically and
technologically feasible for the agency to develop a statistically based protocol
for targeting additional investigative resources toward high-risk mines.
B. Implementing a Targeting Protocol: Practical Challenges
In order to test the efficacy of any given protocol, the most practical
(and methodologically sound) approach would be initially to pilot the protocol
among a select number of "pilot" districts. Only after comparing outcomes in
the pilot districts to outcomes in other non-pilot districts, and confirming that
the program is both tractable and demonstrably efficacious, would it be appro-
priate to consider nationwide implementation.
Yet implementing a pilot program, even in a few districts, would be
costly. Therefore, the threshold practical challenge would be obtaining the re-
sources required to target those mines identified as high-risk. At its current
funding level, MSHA has struggled even to complete all of the mandated annual
inspections required under the Act, and therefore asking MSHA to do "more
with less" is unlikely to be a practical solution. 10 8 Three potential models of
generating earmarked funds merit consideration.
First, MSHA could seek Congressional authorization to slightly relax
the MINE Act's requirement that all surface and underground mines nationwide
be inspected twice and four times a year, respectively. For example, Congress
might require a minimum of only three annual inspections of underground
mines, and/or one inspection of surface mines, to take place in the pilot districts
for the duration of the program. By freeing up a small proportion of the time
that would otherwise be devoted to comprehensive inspections, Congress could
create sufficient regulatory "slack" to enable the program to proceed. In prac-
tice, it could be difficult to garner sufficient support from industry stakeholders
(especially the United Mine Workers) for this option to gain political traction.
106 For a discussion of MSHA's continuing improvement of its data-processing capacity, see
MSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION (FY 2009) 47-48, avail-
able at http://www.dol.gov/dollbudget/2009/PDF/CBJ-2009-V2-09.pdf.
107 LANCASTER, supra note 91, at xiv (noting that "[4n 1989 the computer methods described
here were scarcely known; in 1995 they would have been difficult for a beginner to apply; today,
application of these computer-intensive methods is little (if any) more difficult than application of
the methods traditionally used in applied econometrics").
108 In November of 2007, the Department of Labor issued a report criticizing MSHA's failure
to carry out the required inspections. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
OFFICE OF AUDIT, MINE SAFETY HEALTH ADMINISTRATION: UNDERGROUND COAL MINE
INSPECTION MANDATE NOT FULFILLED DUE TO RESOURCE LIMITATIONS AND LACK OF
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A second approach might be for MSHA to develop partnerships with
individual states that are willing to test innovative methods to enhance mine
safety within their borders. Since MSHA already funds a number of innovative
state programs, there would be ample precedent for such a state-federal collabo-
ration. 1°9 Those states that are already expending state funds on mine-safety
programs might be willing to allocate a portion of these funds to a pilot target-
ing program. Making such collaboration effective would necessitate extensive
and timely information sharing between state and federal officials, which would
require, in turn, considerable startup costs. In the long run, however, such a
collaborative model holds considerable appeal.
Third, MSHA could seek an additional appropriation with which to
conduct a pilot program. Congress has periodically granted MSHA such special
appropriations for a variety of purposes, sometimes as part of much larger bills,
and therefore seeking a Congressional earmark would be one possibility."1
Alternatively, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), the federal agency whose mandate is to conduct research and make
recommendations for the prevention of work-related injury and illness,"' might
finance a pilot program to enable the agency to determine the effectiveness of
targeted-regulation techniques." 1
2
Importantly, the first of these three alternatives (relaxing the minimum
inspection requirements in pilot districts) poses a risk that the other two do not.
If the targeting effort were unsuccessful, it conceivably could lead to a decline
in safety and health in pilot districts, since some mines would be inspected less
frequently than before. In contrast, because the second and third approaches
would not require MSHA to curtail its current enforcement activities, they
should not pose any such risks. In other words, even in the worst case scenario
- in which the targeting algorithm was completely ineffective - the second and
third approaches would enable MSHA to ensure that pilot and non-pilot districts
alike were protected by the same minimum "floor" of regulatory scrutiny.
109 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MSHA STATE GRANT PARTICIPANTS, available at
http://www.msha.govITRAINING/STATES/STATES.asp.
110 In June of 2006, for example, Congress appropriated to MSHA, as part of the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recov-
ery, "$25,600,000 for the enforcement of mine safety law with respect to coal mines, including the
training and equipping of inspectors," provided that MSHA make quarterly progress reports and
use the money by September 30, 2007. P.L. 109-234, 2006 HR 4939 § 7008 (2006).
HI See NIOSH, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ABOUT NIOSH, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/about.html.
112 Because mining remains a dangerous occupation, NIOSH regularly funds research projects
regarding mining safety and health. See NIOSH, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
OFFICE OF EXTRAMuRAL PROGRAMS: PROGRAM REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2005 (DRAFT) 5, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nioshloep/pdfs/Annual-Report-2005.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2008) (discuss-
ing various "[a]reas of focus" in mining research, which include "assessment of safety interven-
tions," "reduction of injuries from materials handling," and "hearing loss prevention").
[Vol. I111
28
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 111, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss1/7
MINING MINING DATA
After funds were secured for a targeting program, the salient practical
question would then become how to put them to use. Once a mine has been
identified as high-risk by a targeting protocol, precisely what exact form(s) of
intervention should state or federal inspectors apply in an effort to reduce its
level of potential hazards? Since mining conditions vary widely across and
within regions, 1 3 it probably would not be prudent to apply an identical inter-
vention strategy to each and every targeted mine. Given the critical importance
of such programmatic design questions, before implementing any pilot program,
MSHA (or its state-level collaborators) would be wise to consult with a wide
variety of stakeholders and mining experts within each pilot district, in order to
formulate a technique (or set of techniques) that was best suited to the condi-
tions characterizing that particular region.
VI. CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article has been to suggest several ways in which em-
pirical analysis could enhance safety-and-health enforcement in U.S. mining.
From a regulatory perspective, what makes the industry unique is not simply the
fact that the Mining Safety and Health Administration has a much larger per-
capita budget at its disposal than its sister agency, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, which oversees the remainder of the U.S. economy.
Additionally, what sets mining apart is the incredibly rich array of fine-grained,
publicly available data on the history of each and every U.S. mine. Remarkably,
mining is the only U.S. industry for which complete information is available not
only on inspections, but also on fatalities, accidents, injuries, employment, pro-
duction, and ownership.
The implications of this fact, I suggest, are profound. First of all, by
analyzing historical data, MSHA could learn much about the relationship be-
tween compliance and safety, the marginal deterrence effect of MSHA inspec-
tions, and the phenomenology of major mining disasters - all of which could
shed new light on the agency's current regulatory practices. Second, in light of
recent methodological and technological advances, mine safety and health en-
forcement would be an ideal context in which to apply advanced regulatory tar-
geting techniques. By designing a statistical algorithm to compare levels of risk
across individual mines, and channeling special resources towards those mines
that are predicted to pose the highest risk, inspectors could adopt a more proac-
tive stance in helping to avert future mining disasters.
Since the above proposals have been sketched only in broad strokes,
many detailed questions of programmatic design remain. Yet given the leveling
off in mining fatality rates since the 1990s - and the recent spike in highly-
113 For an interactive presentation of all fifty states' mining industries, including data on pro-
duction, employment, and consumption, see NATIONAL MINING AsSOCIATION, STATE MINING
STATISTICS, available at http://www.nma.org/statistics/state-statistics.asp (select the year of inter-
est and the desired state from the map).
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publicized mining disasters - this is a particularly opportune time to act. Bring-
ing empirical analysis to bear on the task of reducing mining fatalities could
help save additional lives, and among all of the Department of Labor's constitu-
ent agencies, MSHA is ideally positioned to pioneer and test such regulatory
innovations.
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